The paper investigates the role of speculation in the Liverpool cotton futures market between 1921 and 1929. The analysis is based on historical descriptions of the working of speculation in commodity markets and is related to the tenets of behavioural finance. The model posits the existence of two categories of speculators, noise traders and fundamentalists, who react (differently) to deviations of market prices from their fundamental value. The empirical analysis is based on original data drawn from the online archives of The Times. The empirical findings allow us to conclude that whereas noise traders tend to herd, fundamentalists are more affected by risk aversion and react asymmetrically more to underpricing than to overpricing of the cotton contracts. As expected, the presence of fundamentalists stabilizes the market. Interestingly our results seem to be consistent with the observations of expert witnesses of those markets.
Introduction
The paper investigates the role of speculation in the Liverpool cotton futures market of the 1920s, a period in which staple commodity trading resumes a relevant role in the resurgent post World War I British financial system. The analysis is based on historical descriptions of the working of speculation in commodity markets and is related to the tenets of behavioural finance.
Recent empirical studies detected nonlinearities in the dynamics of the price of assets traded in stock, exchange rate, and commodity markets. Indeed, a rapidly expanding literature suggests that agent heterogeneity may cause nonlinear mean reversion in the asset pricing mechanism. Hommes (1997, 1998) and Westerhoff (2004) , among many others, assume that different groups of agents condition their behavior on differing types of information. The resulting market price is a weighted average of the expectations of these different groups. The basic intuition here is that the weights given to the various strategies shift over time as agents react to their performance.
A related strand of research builds on the original intuition of Frankel and Froot (1986) and focuses on the interaction between chartists (or noise traders) and fundamentalist speculators, which is considered a major determinant of short term price dynamics. Here too the behaviour of agents depends on past profit and the price is driven by an endogenous nonlinear law of motion.
The model set out in this paper analyses commodity price behavior focusing on cotton prices registered in the Liverpool future markets between 1921 and 1929. It differs from previous studies by Westerhoff and Reitz (2005) and Reitz and Westerhoff (2007) in that the strength of both noise and fundamentalist trading varies over time as speculators react -with differing dynamics -to the same information set, viz. to deviations of the previous period's price from its normal long run value. The empirical results are satisfactory and provide an informative behavioural finance insight in a time period and in a market that received but scant scholarly attention.
Interestingly our results seem to be consistent with the observations of expert witnesses of those markets.
The paper improves upon previous research for the following reasons.
First, it provides -to the best of our knowledge -the first behavioural analysis interpretation of commodity speculation in the 1920s, a period in which sophisticated financial operators had to cope with the volatility of market prices using but limited (by our standards) technical and statistical tools. The analysis is based on original data drawn from the online archives of The Times.
Second, it introduces a realistic model which posits that both noise traders and fundamentalists react (differently) to the same information set, viz. to the deviation of the previous week's market price from its fundamental value, proxied by a three-month price moving average. The former extrapolate price changes and the latter adopt a contrarian behavior.
Third, it identifies a clear-cut difference between the reaction of noise traders, that tend to herd as they react rapidly and simultaneously to price deviations from their normal values, and fundamentalists. The former tend to destabilize the market while the latter react more slowly, are risk averse, and bring about stabilizing price adjustments that dampen the short term impact of noise trading.
Based on these considerations, the rest of the paper is organised as follows.
Section 1 discusses the Liverpool cotton futures market in the 1920s and defines the historical and institutional background of the analysis. Section 2 constructs a heterogeneous agent model of cotton price fluctuations. Section 3 contains the statistical analysis of the data. Section 4 investigates the main differences in the trading strategies of fundamentalists and noise-traders.
Section 5 concludes the paper.
Historical and institutional background
In the second half of the nineteenth century, organised futures markets were created for the main commodities, including cotton. This happened mainly in 3 response to developments in communication technology, extended use of warehouse receipts, standardisation of grading systems, expansion of foreign trade and developments in transportation technology (on this see Williams 1982) . Developments in communication (e.g. the laying of the Trans-Atlantic cable in 1866) enabled merchants to anticipate market movements and to trade in advance of delivery. Extended use of warrants and warehouse receipts made it easier to transfer ownership without transferring the assets that underlied the futures contracts. Secondarily, it facilitated the advances of capital against the goods held. The establishment of official grading systems permitted to write contracts for the delivery, within a specified future period of time, of given quantities of standard-grade commodities which did not exist until the time of delivery. Codification of rules on weighing, warehousing, inspection, delivery, centralisation of trading, and the establishment of clearing houses transformed the established practice of forward sales of goods "to arrive" into fully fledged future trading (on this see Williams 1982 and the reference cited). The creation of organised futures markets extended the scope of speculation. "Without a system of grades and receipts there could be no short-selling, and without short-selling there could be no operations […] in which the dealer seeks to secure profit by selling for forward delivery at one price and by making the delivery with goods bought later at a lower price. Under the old methods 'bull' speculation alone was possible; the speculative market is not complete till the machinery for bear 'speculation' is added" (Emery 1896, p. 39 ).
In the 1920s, there were eight cotton futures markets in the world; three were located in the USA (New York, New Orleans and Chicago), three in Europe (Liverpool, Bremen, Havre), one in Egypt (Alexandria) and one in India (Bombay). As a result of rapid communication and of the activity among arbitrageurs, "The price of American cotton tends to be a world price.
It is made primarily in the futures markets of the world, which are based on American cotton, because the American crop is the most highly standardized and the most liquid [...] The futures markets are the clearing houses for all information which affects either the supply of cotton or the demand for it" 4 (Cox 192, p. 176) . The Liverpool market played a very prominent role in the World cotton market as discussed in more detail in Section 1.1 below.
The Liverpool cotton futures market in the 1920s
Until the early nineteenth century British cotton imports came mainly from the British West Indies (75% in 1786-90) and from Mediterranean countries (19% in 1786-90) . At the beginning of the twentieth century the situation had dramatically changed and Britain mainly depended on imports of American cotton (77% in 1901-1904 , against less than 1% in 1786-90).
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The development of organized cotton markets started in late eighteenth century, when British cotton trade began to grow quickly in volume, importance, and technical organization and when cultivation of cotton was first attempted in North America, to lead the USA soon to become the most important producer in the world (Cristiano and Naldi 2012) . It hosted different categories of merchants including: 1) importing houses, 2) selling brokers (assisting importers in reselling the cotton after its arrival in Liverpool), 3) Spinners' buying brokers (buying cotton on behalf of mills), 4) 1 Source Chapman and McFarlane (1907) . On early Liverpool cotton imports and the organization of the cotton market in the XVIII century see Dunbell (1923) . On the development of commodity futures markets in London and Liverpool see also Cranston (2007) . 2 As Williams (1982, p. 306) recalls: "Although the year 1869 has been given as the earliest date for written rules in Liverpool, the minutes of the Liverpool Cotton Brokers Association for 19 April and 17 June 1864 mention the voting into force of rules for cotton 'to arrive'. For a early account of the creation of the Liverpool Cotton Market and of the Liverpool Broker's Association see Ellison (1886) . merchant brokers (who imported and sold cotton to their own spinners).
Merchants were divided into two groups: full members, who set the policies of the Association, and associate members. Full membership was limited to 600 and reserved to British citizens. There were no fixed limits for associate members, who were divided in seven distinct categories.
In the period which our analysis refers to (1921 -1929) As Cox (1927) professional and non professional, as discussed in more detail in Section 1.2 below.
Speculation and pricing in cotton futures markets
In the 1920s the study of the relationship between futures markets and speculation was in its early stages. Emery (1896) allows his attention to be distracted by momentary excitement is apt to miss the important truth behind the market", Hubbard (1923, p. 436 -437) . 6 Hubbard also agrees with Emery on the difference between speculation and gambling but differs from him in assigning hedgers a more prominent role in determining futures prices.
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Hubbard defines hedging as a form of trade insurance by which merchants, selling (buying) cotton of quality x spot, in advance of delivery, can protect themselves against price rises (falls) by buying (selling) contracts for future delivery (futures) of standard quality cotton 7 . Both categories of hedgers, buyers and sellers, are simultaneously present in the futures markets all the time, and most transactions originate with them and often offset each other.
If "the methods of hedging were entirely perfect speculation would be utterly eliminated" (Hubbard 1923, p. 310) . In this context, the main role of speculation in the futures market, the activity which aims to make profit from conjectural fluctuations in prices rather than from ordinary trade, is to equalize imbalances between supply and demand coming from hedgers.
Hubbard identifies two types of speculators: competent and incompetent and notes that merchants, producers and spinners become speculators themselves if they sell or buy cotton spot without offsetting this transaction by a reverse transactions in the future market. instead, constantly shift their position, often reversing it when they incur losses. They tend to be convinced by the force of the market itself, are prone over-enthusiasm and over-trading. Over-trading, in particular, is responsible for the confusing upward and downward zigzag patterns which can be observed on price charts 8 .
Heterogeneous agent model of cotton price fluctuations
Hubbard's analysis of the cotton futures market, as discussed in Section 1 above, may be synthesized as follows: 1) speculation is based on market fundamentals and plays an essential role in determining futures prices, 2) two types of speculators exist: professional (fundamentalists) and non professional (noise traders), 3) deviations from fundamentals are mainly due to the public and to non professional speculators entering into the market.
We empirically test the validity of this description by extending the chartistfundamentalist approach of Reitz and Westerhoff (2003) which, in turn, relies on previous analyses by Day and Huang (1990) and Lux and Marchesi (2000) , among others.
As shown in Cifarelli and Paesani (2012) , in the time period under investigation commodity markets are not informationally efficient in the sense of Fama (1970) and cotton price rates of change are serially correlated. Taking this into account, the present study posits that prices do not react only to exogenous news but have also a relevant endogenous driver which is attributed to the interaction of two groups of speculators, noise traders and fundamentalists that belong to two distinct and partially overlapping pools of variable size.
It is assumed that both fundamentalists and noise traders react -admittedly in a highly differing way -to a perception of market mispricing. Noise traders extrapolate the existing price trend and, introducing a positive feedback loop in the dynamics, raise price volatility. Fundamentalist contrarian behavior usually reduces price deviations from their normal (equilibrium) value and dampens market variability. 
N is the normal (equilibrium) price of the commodity spot/futures contract. 
Statistical analysis of cotton price dynamics

Empirical specification of the model
Cotton spot and futures price rates of change are heteroskedastic when the data are sampled, as is the case in this paper, with a weekly frequency. A 12 The selection of the smooth transmission parameterization of equations (3), (5) and (6) is justified, according to Teräsvirta (1994) , by the plurality of the agents that are involved in the decision process. Even if the single speculator takes a dichotomous decision, it is unlikely that all agents act simultaneously. Since the price series provide information on the aggregate decision process only, the overall impact will be smooth rather than discrete.
GARCH procedure is therefore used -following Lundberg and Teräsvirta (1998) The prices come from the online archives of The Times (Sections: home commercial markets). They refer to the Liverpool American Future Contract, discussed in Section 1.1, and are quoted in pence and hundredths of a pence per pound. As can be seen from the graph set out in Figure 1 , prices exhibit a cyclical behaviour, characterized by uneven bouts of volatility clustering; whenever noise traders enter the market, we expect price variability to rise, whilst fundamentalist dominance is likely to exert a dampening pressure. On this see Rowe (1936, pp. 102 -103) and the section devoted to cotton in The Special Memoranda on stocks of staple commodities, written by J.M. Keynes for the London and Cambridge Economic Service (Keynes 1983 ) and Cifarelli and Paesani (2012) , Appendix 1.
Summary statisics are presented in Table 1 . Returns are computed as first differences of the logarithms of the price levels. The time series distributions are asymmetric and leptokurtic. (Engle and Ng, 1993) . The data have a weekly frequency over the sample period 7 January 1921 -31 December 1929.
Intertemporal dependency of weekly returns seems to be stronger for cash than for futures weekly returns. Volatility clustering affects the time series, as shown by the significant serial correlation of the squared weekly returns.
This finding supports the choice of a GARCH parameterization of the conditional second moments. Howell (1939) contains extensive analysis of cotton production and trade in the 1920s and 1930s.
Quasi-ML model estimates
Parsimonious ML estimates of the nonlinear model, equations (6') -(7) are set out in Table 2 . The specification of the system is justified by an accurate preliminary investigation which follows the procedure suggested by Teräsvirta (1994) . At first the order of the cash/spot return autocorrelations is selected on the basis of the Akaike Information Criterion; a one week lag provides uniformly the best fit. A test of linearity against the nonlinear parameterization of equation (6') is then performed adopting the procedure of Luukkonen et al. (1988) , as modified by Wan and Kao (2009 Notes. t-ratios in parentheses and probability values in square brackets; LLF: Log Likelihood value; Skew: Skewness; E.Kurt: Excess Kurtosis; JB: Jarque-Bera normality test; Auto(n): Ljung-Box test statistic for nth order serial correlation; ARCH(n): Ljung-Box tests statistic for n-th order serial correlation of the squared time series; JTA: Joint Wald test of the null hypothesis of no asymmetry; LM-NLT: LM nonlinearity test; LM-RNLT: residual non-linearity test; LRT(x=0): likelihood ratio test of the null hypothesis x=0. The data have a weekly frequency over the sample period 7 January 1921 -31 December 1929. The sample includes 469 observations. serially uncorrelated). The estimates of equation (6') reflect the autocorrelation of the cotton spot and futures return time series; the tenets of the efficient markets theory do not apply to the cotton market of the 1920s. The JTA sign bias tests of Engle and Ng (1993) support the choice of a symmetric conditional variance parameterization since the strong asymmetry of the original return time series detected in Table 1 is filtered out by the specification of the conditional means. The conditional normality of the standardized residuals, however, is rejected by the Jarque Bera test statistics. The t-ratios reported in Table 2 are therefore based on the quasimaximum likelihood estimation procedure of Bollerslev and Wooldridge (1992) . Finally, the F-test for no remaining nonlinearity, set out in the LM-RNLT row (see Eitrheim and Teräsvirta, 1996, pages 63-65) , suggest that the model accounts for the nonlinearities of the data, especially those of the spot/cash return time series.
The conditional mean estimates support the nonlinear parameterization of the noise trader/fundamentalist behavior, especially in the case of the spot/cash and one month to maturity futures contracts. The coefficients, as shall be shown below, identify a complex dynamic reaction to price deviations from their normal value. 15 The coefficients of the three month to maturity contracts are smaller in absolute value and detect a systematic reduction in the speed of market reaction to price movements. Trading seems to become less frequent and the relevance of both noise traders and fundamentalists decreases with the maturity of the futures contracts. Indeed, the GARCH parameters detect a progressive decline in informational efficiency since volatility seems to be more affected by past innovations and less sensitive to own lagged values as contract maturity rises.
Fundamentalist and noise traders' pricing dynamics
The value of the speed of adjustment coefficients, differs according both to the nature of the speculator and to the type of contract. Table 3 , The value of the means, median and standard deviations relative to noise traders exceed those of fundamentalists, over the three contracts. As the maturity of the contract rises the fraction of noise traders entering the market tends to decline, whilst the fraction of fundamentalists tends to rise; destabilizing speculation tends to focus on the spot and on the one month to maturity futures sections of the cotton market. 17 Ellen ter and Zwinkels (2010) follow De Jong et al (2009) ) and attribute strategy persistence to a relevant status quo bias. 18 The local regressions are performed on a sub sample selected according to the Cleveland (1993) procedure and involves about 100 evaluation points. Tricube weights are used in the weighted regressions used to minimize the weighted sum of squared residuals. The bandwidth span of each local regression is set to 0.3. Table 3 .
As expected, fundamentalist speculation stabilizes market prices. In order to quantify this effect we perform a dynamic ex post (historical) simulation exercise. First, we simulate the non-linear chartist contribution to the price determination process i.e. 
Conclusions
Building on preliminary historical and institutional reconstruction, our analysis of speculation in the Liverpool cotton futures market validates the choice of applying a behavioural finance approach to historical data. This assertion is justified both by the quality of the empirical findings and by the their coherence with the main conclusions of qualitative analyses performed in the 1920s and 1930s. In particular, we find a strong analogy between Hubbard's distinction between competent and incompetent speculators and our own noise traders and fundamentalist speculators.
Based on these considerations, our main findings may be summarized as follows. First, the entry into the market of speculators varies over time and is affected by different reactions to a common perception of market disequilibrium. Second, whereas noise traders tend to herd, fundamentalists are more affected by risk aversion and react asymmetrically more to
